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Prologue: Imagine the following scenario. A black male employee,
Walter, has been subjected to vicious racial insults in the workplace.
Friends and family have tried to console him. The continuing harassment
and verbal assault has come from his direct supervisor. He felt his only
recourse was to file a complaint charging the supervisor with employment
discrimination based on race. He has struggled unsuccessfully to find a
lawyer and started taking medication to handle his depression.
A government agency that processes employment discrimination
charges has suggested that it might be helpful to use mediation. During the
mediation, the mediator discovers that Walter's main concern is moving on
with his life and that all Walter wants is for the verbal insults to stop and an
apology from his supervisor. The mediator believes that Walter has a
strong case for recovery under law and tells Walter that he should consider
obtaining legal advice. Walter tells the mediator that his peace of mind is
all he really wants. If Walter gets an apology and no longer has to deal
with the verbal insults, his only desire is for all of this to go away. The
employer agrees to transfer the supervisor so that he no longer supervises
Walter, and the supervisor will give Walter a written apology and say it to
him orally.
Some outsiders might view this as a nice, quick, and private resolution
of an employment dispute based upon the desires of the parties. Others
might think the mediator failed Walter by letting Walter agree to settle a
case when societal notions ofjustice, as established by legal norms, would
suggest that Walter was entitled to much more from his employer and could
have obtained it in the court system. Critics have suggested that we not
rush to suppress these kinds of conflict; instead, we must allow the courts to
handle them:
Yet, in a society like ours, tension among groups may be normal, and not a
sign of social pathology. With a history of slavery, conquest, and racist
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immigration laws, the United States today exhibits the largest gap between
the wealthy and the poor of any Western industrialized society. Until
recently, Southern states segregated school children by race and
criminalized marriage between whites and blacks. Surely, in such a society,
one would expect the have-nots to attempt to change their social position
(by legal or illegal means), and the haves to resist these attempts. Conflict
is a logical and expected result.'
Whether mediation just offers a second-class system of justice for
employees like Walter that is aimed at suppressing their conflicts rather
than offering a just result presents one of the growing concerns about the
mediation of employment discrimination claims.
I.
INTRODUCTION:
MARKERS FOR JUSTICE AND MEDIATION
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
The year 2004 represented a significant landmark for seeking justice in
our court system as the fifty-year anniversary occurred for the legendary
Brown v. Board of Education2 Supreme Court decision and its ban on
separate-but-equal education. A significant historical reference for
employees seeking justice in our court system also transpired in 2004 with
the arrival of the fortieth anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,3 which banned employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, religion, and national origin.4 It also signaled the thirtieth anniversary
of a noteworthy article by Marc Galanter that illuminated many concerns
about our legal system by questioning whether the haves (referred to as
"repeat player" entities with extensive resources for litigation) in our
society control the litigation results and opportunities for justice of the
have-nots (referred to as "one-shotter" litigants unfamiliar with the
litigation process and with limited resources).'
Despite such noteworthy markers for justice in 2004, we still have
many concerns today. As Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
noted just in 2003, "[t]here is sad evidence all across the nation that a
1. Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative
Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 770-71 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2004)).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1) to (2) (2004).
5. Marc S. Galanter, Why the "'Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-98, 106-07 (1974) (defining a "repeat player" as an individual or
entity that has "had and anticipates repeated litigation" and "has low stakes in the outcome of any case,
and which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests" and defining a "one-shotter" as those
having limited resources to pursue litigation and "only occasional recourse to the courts").
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substantial number of our citizens believe our legal and judicial system is
unresponsive to them . . . that too often equal justice is but an unrealized
slogan."6 While appreciating that "in spite of its problems the American
justice system is still the best in the world," a recent study identified that
"nearly half of those surveyed believed that the courts do not treat all ethnic
and racial groups the same."'
The quote in the prologue of this Article by Richard Delgado, a
consistent critic of the use of informal methods of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR),8 suggests a possible focus for those concerned about our
judicial system. If we recognize that conflict is a necessary byproduct of
our system of justice, we may then proceed to design effective conflict
resolution systems that fairly resolve those disputes.9 Unlike Delgado, who
has indicated recently that he views mediation specifically with significant
disdain and contempt,"0 in this Article I assert that mediation offers great
potential for the fair resolution of employment discrimination claims,
especially given the difficulties that employees face when attempting to
adjudicate their discrimination claims in the formal court system."1 Despite
his fascination with the formal court system and the public values that it
purportedly guarantees, Delgado has even admitted that the reasons for his
support of formal court resolutions may "not necessarily [be] true" and that
he agrees "with informality being better than formality" when the courts
and judges appear to be hostile to certain types of claims. 2 Employment
discrimination claims continue to be one area where Delgado's reasons for
formal court resolutions do not exist. The results from studies of Title VII
6. See Anne Gearan, Work for Racial Justice, O'Connor Tells Law School's Grads, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, May 26, 2003, at 3A.
7. Dennis Archer, Eradicating Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, I MINORITY TRIAL LAW. I
(Spring 2003).
8. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An Essayfor Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1400, 1402 (1997) [hereinafter Delgado, Conflict as
Pathology]; Delgado, supra note 1; see also Phyllis E. Bernard, Only Nixon Could Go to China: Third
Thoughts on the Uniform Mediation Act, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 113, 140 (2001) (referring to Delgado as the
"principal proponent" of attacks on mediation because of power imbalances for "minorities in American
society").
9. See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment
Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 (2002). Lisa Bingham has also raised concerns about dispute
system design in commercial disputes. Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and
Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 251 (2004) (asserting that
arbitration systems created through adhesion agreements designed by the stronger party to bind the
weaker party should be treated "with a healthy dose of skepticism" by the courts because they may
"allow one party to nullify public policy as embodied in law").
10. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and Brown
v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 How. L.J. 473, 487 (2004) ("Courts kill
stories-mediation kills dreams.").
11. See infra text accompanying notes 20-31 (identifying the host of problems that employees
have in trying to bring their discrimination claims to a successful resolution through the court system).
12. Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 8, at 1400.
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cases suggest a court system and a judiciary that is hostile to employment
discrimination claims both at the trial level and on appeal.' 3
Accordingly, this Article's thesis is that by the end of 2005, both
victims of workplace discrimination and employers should move to
embrace mediation as a potential mechanism for resolving their disputes. 4
Given the difficulties with court resolution of employment discrimination
claims, mediation can allow both parties to craft their own resolution rather
than have judges or juries or even arbitrators make those decisions. With
respect to resolution through mediation for more disputes involving claims
under public statutes such as Title VII, some concerns have arisen.
Whether mediators should be more involved in assessing and evaluating
legal norms to bridge the gap between party self-determination and social
justice through established legal norms while still maintaining their
neutrality remains an issue of major debate. 5 However, it is foolish to
expect mediators involved in workplace disputes to deliver social justice, a
concept that reflects society's norms, when mediation arises through private
contracts that only reflect the norms of the individual parties, especially the
party with the most bargaining power.
Nevertheless, to address the concerns that mediation may only
represent a second-class system of justice for employees, certain procedures
and design features must accompany any mediation process that the parties
use to resolve Title VII claims. As part of an overall approach to a healthy
conflict resolution system, mediation must include safeguards that support a
realistic opportunity for legal representation, a fair selection of mediators
from a core and critical mass of qualified people of color and women, and
an opportunity for employees to have a role in its design of reasonable and
balanced procedures. The court system, however, must still remain a viable
and available option for participants in the mediation process. The potential
13. See infra text accompanying notes 20-31.
14. Suggesting that parties embrace mediation in resolving employment discrimination disputes
may subject me to criticism for being a mediation romanticist. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real
Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime,
2000 J. DiSP. RESOL. 371, 385-86 (counseling against becoming a mediation romanticist). However, I
am not a mesmerized zealot who thinks that mediation consists of some magic potion that will heal all
that ails the employment discrimination dispute resolution process. See id. (criticizing those who
believe in mediation "based on a romantic, almost theological view of the process rather than faith based
on empirical evidence and substantive rationality" and asserting that "one should not be a... mediation
romanticist"). Rather, I embrace mediation for employment discrimination disputes with the reservation
that certain procedural and design requirements should be put in place to allow for employee self-
determination and involvement in system design along with the option to pursue claims in the court
system, if necessary, in the event that an employee decides that mediation cannot resolve the dispute.
15. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from
Ideology, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247 (describing the debate and asserting more support for the use of
eclectic mediation which allows doses of evaluative forms of mediation); Stempel, supra note 14; Ellen
A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155 (1998).
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for recourse through the court system casts a shadow over the parties'
ability to bargain an effective resolution in mediation.16  Also, some
disputes cannot be resolved through private mechanisms like mediation and
will require a formal and public court resolution. 7
Although I recognize and appreciate the important societal concern of
having formal dispute resolution, I focus my approach to mediation of
employment discrimination claims on what the disputants want and how to
help them attain their highest level of needs or self-actualization."8 I believe
that public and societal concerns about the way that employment
discrimination claims should be justly resolved and how public resolutions
help to guide the future conduct of employers can still be addressed despite
the growing use of private resolution because there will be enough disputes
that parties cannot resolve in mediation. Those matters will still get into the
courts to allow for and address the public and societal concerns underlying
16. See James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey
of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 172 n.6 (2001) (referring to the importance of legal
norms in mediation and noting that the shadow "metaphor is borrowed (and altered) from an article that
has become a classic in the ADR field, Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)"); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute
Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 347 n. 149 (2003) [hereinafter Stempel, Fuzziness](explaining how bargaining and negotiation involved in informal dispute resolution is dependent upon
the "likely outcomes if [a] dispute is adjudicated to conclusion"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on
Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 308 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel, Reflections]
(identifying the significance of having legitimate court options involving an "adjudicatory core to cast
'the shadow of law' that enables ADR and settlement to function effectively"); Rachel H. Yarkon, Note,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Negotiated Settlement of Gender Discrimination Claims
Arising From Termination of Employment, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 166 n.3 (1997) (explaining
that bargaining in the shadow of the law refers to an understanding of "how rules and procedures used in
court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs between [parties] outside the
courtroom" and finding that "[i]n the . . . discrimination context, case law creates bargaining
endowments that impact what parties will accept in settlement") (citation omitted).
17. See Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges in a
Changing Environment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 538 (2003) (finding that "certain cases ought to
go through trial and appeal so as to create significant law to guide and bind interested persons in the
future"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual
History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1623 (1997) (arguing for the necessity of adjudication to
"generate rules and norms, and to exist as a final resort when the parties cannot resolve things
themselves"); Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of
Justice, 3 NEV. L. J. 289, 303 (2003) (asserting the importance of a conflict resolution "system that
contains multiple procedures (e.g. both litigation and mediation)").
18. According to motivational psychologist Abraham Maslow's assessment of needs, individual
needs move along five levels of hierarchy starting with the basic need of food and shelter and ending
with the need for self-actualization as the highest level of need that individuals in our society have. See
Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997, 1031 & n.220 (2004)(describing Maslow's hierarchy of needs including the highest need of "self-actualization, or the
reaching of one's full potential") (citing ABRAHAM MASLOW, HIERARCHY OF NEEDS (1954); ABRAHAM
MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954); ABRAHAM MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF
BEING (1962); ABRAHAM MASLOW, A THEORY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION (1968)).
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the resolution of disputes brought pursuant to a federal statute aimed at
eradicating workplace discrimination. 9
In Part II, this Article describes the way in which employment
discrimination disputants have increasingly used various forms of ADR,
with mediation becoming the predominant choice. Part III explores the
middle ground between two opposing views-those who expect too much
out of mediators in terms of them delivering social justice and transforming
relationships versus those who take too narrow a perspective regarding the
roles mediators can play in mediation because of purported neutrality
concerns. This Part suggests major opportunities for using mediation in
resolving Title VII claims when the mediator's approach and orientation
focuses on party self-determination while at the same time wrestling with
the dynamics of social justice. In Part IV, the Article proposes a mediation
design that can allow both the haves and the have-nots to effectively resolve
their employment discrimination disputes. The Article concludes that the
use of mediation as the primary ADR tool to tackle employment
discrimination in the twenty-first century can represent an excellent choice
if it involves the use of certain process guidelines and guarantees to make it
fair for the have-nots.
II.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND THE ROAD TO MEDIATION
Concerns about the legal justice system ring true especially for
employment discrimination claimants as empirical studies demonstrate that
these plaintiffs fare worse in the court system."0 In 2000, employment
19. But see Stemlight, supra note 17, at 304 n.76 (addressing the issue as to who should decide
which disputes should go into which process and asserting that "[b]ecause disputes and dispute
resolution affect the public as well as disputants, . .. this [decision] should be, in part, a societal
decision, and not merely left to disputants"). Nevertheless, parties can still proceed as private attorney
generals in bringing lawsuits to address societal concerns about civil rights. See generally Myriam E.
Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) (suggesting that private enforcement of civil rights laws
would be strengthened by allowing governmental law enforcement agencies to deputize individuals or
private organizations to pursue civil rights violations and also highlighting creative approaches to
advancing important societal concerns about civil rights through the courts). There is no indication that
the courts "will have to beg for work, especially in the employment area" as "the EEOC, as well as
private parties (ordinarily through class actions), will, presumably, continue to bring lawsuits
challenging a 'pattern and practice' of illegal conduct." Berger, supra note 17, at 538.
20. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 451-52 (2004) (describing "a troublesome
'anti-plaintiff effect in federal appellate courts" for employment discrimination claimants along with a
bias against plaintiffs at the trial level) (original emphasis); Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547
(2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights
Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947; THEODORE EISENBERG &
2005
328 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 26:2
discrimination claims represented "nearly 10 percent of federal civil
cases." 2' By 2002, "discrimination complaints filed by workers against
private employers jumped more than 4 percent ... to the highest level since
1995. "22 Although "most employment discrimination cases settle" without
a court resolution,23 the truth remains that when employment discrimination
plaintiffs do go to trial they "win less often than other plaintiffs" and they
prevail on their claims at "only half the rate of other plaintiffs. 24
Furthermore, "employment discrimination plaintiffs have won 4.23 percent
of their pretrial adjudications, while other plaintiffs won 22.23 percent of
their pretrial adjudications. 25
On appeals of final federal court employment discrimination decisions,
both pretrial adjudications and trials on the merits, "the clear fact is that the
defendants' reversal rate far exceeds the plaintiffs' reversal rate. '26 There
does not appear to be a good explanation for why the review of employment
discrimination claims leads "appellate courts [to] reverse plaintiffs' wins
below far more often than defendants' wins" with defendants winning
reversals on appeal versus plaintiffs winning reversal on appeal "at the
pretrial stage (54 percent to 11 percent)" and "at the trial stage (42 percent
to 8 percent). ' 27  However, some commentators have concluded that with
"defendants succeeding more than plaintiffs on appeal, and much more so
in employment discrimination cases," judges at both the trial and appellate
level must maintain a general hostility towards employment discrimination
claims. 8
STEWART J. SCHWAB, EMPIRICAL STUDY SUGGESTS BIAS IN U.S. APPELLATE COURTS: DOUBLE
STANDARD ON APPEAL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (2001) (describing an empirical study conducted at the request of two
plaintiffs' employment discrimination firms and finding that "[e]mployment discrimination plaintiffs are
far more likely than defendants to be reversed on appeal" because "only 5.8 percent [of defendants']
judgments are reversed" when "43.61 percent of [plaintiffs'] judgments are reversed"), available at
http://www.findjustice.com/pdf/double-standard.PDF; see also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555, 560-61 (2001) (asserting that employers
prevail in 98% of federal court employment discrimination cases resolved at the pretrial stage).
21. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 20, at 432.
22. Job Bias Complaints Climb to 7-Year High, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2003, at C5 (current EEOC
Chairwoman Cari M. Dominguez stated that a "poor economy, an aging and multinational work force
and backlash from the 2001 terrorist attacks likely contributed to the increase" and "[a]llegations of race
and gender discrimination accounted for a majority of the complaints, at 35 percent and 30 percent,
respectively").
23. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 20, at 440 (describing how "almost 70 percent of
employment discrimination and other cases are terminated by settlement").
24. Id. at 441.
25. Id. at 444.
26. Id. at 449 (citing Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 957-59).
27. Id. at 450.
28. Id. at 451.
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Because of the poor results for employment discrimination claimants in
the court system, one commentator has lamented that "employment
discrimination cases are notoriously difficult-not easy-to win."29 Another
commentator has suggested that "the difficulty in resolving [employment
discrimination claims] is due to a series of factors that tend to span across
international borders, despite cultural and legal differences among various
societies."30 Even plaintiffs' "lawyers admit it's tough to beat employers in
discrimination cases."'"
Despite many positive changes that have occurred as a result of Title
VII's enactment more than forty years ago,32 the current results from the
court system offer little promise for most employment discrimination
claimants. Accordingly, many advocates for ADR have asserted that the
use of informal alternatives to the court system, such as arbitration, may
provide employment discrimination claimants a more realistic chance for a
fair resolution to their disputes.33
29. Selmi, supra note 20, at 556.
30. See Jean R. Stemlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1468 (2004). Professor Jean
Sternlight has suggested that the following ten factors make individual employment discrimination
claims difficult to resolve: complex laws; highly contested and confusing facts; involvement of
significant non-legal as well as legal interests; societal need for correct determinations; societal need for
clear and public precedents to guide future conduct and deter future misconduct; the need for adequate
compensation of victims of discrimination; the societal need to punish wrongdoers; unavailability of a
fair procedural mechanism to assert claims; the need for quick resolution of claims to allow parties to
move forward with their lives and business; and alleged victims tend to have less resources than the
alleged perpetrators. Id. at 1468-82.
31. See Susan Mandel, Equal Treatment? Study Shows a Wide Gap Between Worker, Employer
Wins in Job Bias Appeals, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 24; see also Selmi, supra note 20, at 560-61
(asserting that employers prevail in 98% of federal court employment discrimination cases resolved at
the pre-trial stage); Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L.
REV. 577, 585 (2001) (reviewing Title VII summary judgment analysis and criticizing the courts for
slicing and dicing away all of the plaintiff's evidence as part of a process that allows the employer to
prevail); see also Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. & Cyrus Mehri, Empirical Study Suggests Bias in U.S.
Appellate Courts: Joint Statement of Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. and Cyrus Mehri (stating the fact that the
employment discrimination "defendant has an incredible 43% chance of reversing the plaintiffs victory
... is particularly troubling when one considers that these are cases in which plaintiffs typically have
already overcome difficult summary judgment motions, prevailed at trial, and survived post-trial
motions."), available at http://www.findjustice.com/civil-just/joint-statement.htm. (last visited Oct. 15,
2005).
32. Many point to the increase in the number of black members of the middle-class as being
indicative of the positive outcomes from Title VII. See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title Vll's
Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 472-74 & nn.481-90 (1995).
However, continuing differences in wealth and income between blacks and whites indicate there is still
much more room for improvement. See Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in
Discrimination Disputes as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 96 & n.188 (2004) (stating that "[a] recent report by the National Urban League
indicated that the mean income of black males is seventy percent the mean income of white males, with
a $16,876 gap").
33. See, e.g., Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact
and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1069 (1996); Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial
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Despite the difficulties for employees and the corresponding positive
results for employers in the courts, many employers rushed to use
arbitration out of a fear of juries, 34  which became available with
amendments to Title VII in 1991.11 "[T]he American Arbitration
Association (AAA) has claimed that between 1997 and 2002, the number of
employees covered by AAA employment arbitration plans grew from 3
million to 6 million. '36  However, many commentators immediately
criticized employers' use of arbitration as an unfair and coercive attempt to
circumvent their obligations under Title VII because they used adhesion
agreements to require their employees agree as a condition of employment
to arbitrate any future disputes that may arise, sometimes referred to as
mandatory arbitration.37
Procedures to Resolve Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 158
(2001); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001) [hereinafter,
Estreicher, Saturns]; Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1349 (1997); Lewis Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace
Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 106-07 (2003); Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration
and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 29, 57 (1998); Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the
Gilmer Court Lost The Opportunity For Alternative Dispute Resolution To Improve Civil Rights, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1994); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bathwater, and Constructing A New Sink, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99-100 (1999); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining
Context, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 491, 499 (2001); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory
Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1998).
34. See ADR Vision Roundtable: Challenges for the 21 Century, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct. 2001, at 8,
10 (quoting Samuel Estreicher in explaining that the growth in the use of ADR in employment disputes
since 1991 was "in part a response to the initiation ofjury trials [in] the discrimination area" at that time
and "the desire [of employers] to be free of the unpredictability of jury awards"); E. Patrick McDermott
& Ruth Obar, Workplace Dispute Resolution After Circuit City: A Complainant's Perspective on
Employer Dispute Resolution Programs Requiring Mandatory Arbitration, 48 WAYNE L. REv. 1157,
1162 (2002) (asserting that "[i]njuries are generally considered to be more pro-plaintiff/anti-employer
than federal judges are" and how the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowing jury trials and the
right to compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimination along with the growth of
other employment laws has "caused more employers to consider the use of ADR to avoid adjudication
of such disputes in the courtroom").
35. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 101-102, 105 Stat. 1071-74 (1991)(codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a (2004)) (granting the right to compensatory and punitive
damage remedies and the right to a jury trial to claimants filing claims of intentional discrimination
under Title VII while placing caps on recovery of $50,000 for employers with less than 101 employees
and gradual monetary increases corresponding to the increasing number of employees in the workforce
up to a maximum of $500,000 for employers with more than 500 employees).
36. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of
"'Alternative Dispute Resolution ", I J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 843, 900 (2004).
37. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just? 57 STAN. L.
REv. 1631 (2005) (describing the growth and criticism of mandatory arbitration agreements). Although
there are likely scores of other articles discussing the subject of mandatory arbitration in employment, I
have found the following articles of value in understanding this criticism. See Reginald Alleyne,
Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
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Although arbitration became the initial focus, and there are still some
issues to be addressed about its fairness, employers have started to
recognize some of the concerns about mandatory arbitration. Their
enthusiasm for this form of ADR in handling employment disputes may be
waning. 38 As a response to the backlash against arbitration, mediation has
started to replace arbitration.39 In the employment setting, mediation is now
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998);
Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (1997); Sarah
Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Christine Godsil
Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?-Some Ruminations On the Arbitration of Discrimination
Claims, II ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1992); Joseph R. Grodin, On The Interface Between Labor
And Employment Law, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 310-11 (1998); Karen Halverson,
Arbitration and The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445 (1999); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999);
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33; Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to
Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HoFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479
(2001); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea Or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L. Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990's, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1017 (1996). However, others have argued that standard form adhesion agreements add value to a
company and save costs that benefit employees. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to
Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 555-61 (2002) (arguing that standard form adhesion agreements to
arbitrate save costs and provide fair options and being forced to not use these agreement will add to the
costs and make the agreements unfair for employees); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 771-72 (asserting there are sound business reasons for standard form
adhesion agreements to arbitrate so that they are not necessarily unfair); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89,
91-93 (asserting that adhesion agreements to arbitrate are fair in that they allow companies to pass on
savings in costs from standard forms to their customers and employees). But see Jean R. Stemlight, Is
the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach To Mandatory Consumer and Employment
Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 840 n.65 (2002) (asserting that
any cost savings resulting from standard form arbitration clauses do not get passed back to employees
because "absent perfect competition, companies will be able to keep any profits they secure by imposing
binding arbitration").
38. See Simon J. Nadel, Mandatory Arbitration Not for All Employers; Cost, Fairness Still Subject
of Debate, 70 U.S.L.W. 2755, 2756 (June 4, 2002) (describing comments of management counsel and a
member of the Human Resources think tank Employment Roundtable, Stuart Brody, about how
mandatory arbitration agreements are "'counterproductive' to creating a high-performance workplace
and increasing retention rates" and "they will end up costing employers in terms of turnover, morale,
and worker performance" because "this is not the way you get productivity out of people").
39. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for
Evaluative Mediation, and What It Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 111 (2002)
(describing how mediation is replacing arbitration as a preferred dispute resolution option); John Lande,
Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 137 (2000) (referring to empirical study from questionnaire given to outside counsel, in-house
counsel, and corporate executives demonstrating that all three groups think favorably of using mediation
to resolve business dispates); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay
and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003) (arguing for the use of mediation as a
supplement to litigation); Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker: With Mediation
Emerging as the Most Popular Form ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, the Quest for Common Ground
Could Force Attorneys to Reinterpret Everything They Do in the Future, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 55
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growing and also becoming the preferred method by all stakeholders,
employers, employees and their lawyers, for resolving disputes involving
employment matters.40 Similarly, several commentators, including me,have also promoted the use of mediation in certain employment
discrimination situations.4' At the same time, mediation of employment
disputes has started to grow outside the United States, too.42
(describing an ABA poll of lawyers that "confirms a preference for mediation over litigation and
arbitration as the dispute resolution method of choice, which is consistent with other signs mediation isgaining ground"). But see Deborah Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 81, 85 (arguing that the premise under which parties with legal claims prefer to
resolve their "claims through mediation rather than adversarial litigation and adjudication seems to bebased on questionable assumptions and debatable extrapolations from other social conflict contexts").
40. See Jeff Kichaven & Deborah Rothman, Lawyers Speak Out on Justifying Court Mediation toTheir Clients, 21 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. 149, 166 (2003) (describing how "mediationhas become so thoroughly accepted by the employment bar" and identifying comments from bothplaintiffs' and defendants' counsel supporting the use of mediation in employment disputes);Stipanowich, supra note 36, at 886 n.175 (describing a 2002 survey of 43 Fortune 1000 companies andfinding that "mediation was the most frequently preferred approach in employment ... disputes"); ArupVarma & Lamont E. Stallworth, Participants' Satisfaction With EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal
Representation: An Empirical Inquiry, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 387, 392 (2002) (highlighting thegrowing preference for using mediation in resolving employment discrimination claims); see alsoBerger, supra note 17 (advocating the benefits of using mediation for employment discriminationdisputes with some concerns); Bruce A. Coane & Ross W. Wooten, Successful Strategies in MediatingEmployment Cases, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 901 (1997) (highlighting strategies and benefits of using
mediation in employment disputes from the plaintiffs perspective); Craver, supra note 33, at 145-50(describing potential benefits of mediating employment discrimination charges); Cindy Cole Ettingoff &Gregory Powell, Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in Employment-Related Disputes, 26 U. MEM. L.REV. 1131 (1996) (asserting the benefits of using ADR including mediation for employment disputes);Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 365(2004) (asserting the value of using mediation in employment disputes in union and non-union
workplaces); Homer LaRue, The Changing Workplace Environment in the New Millennium: ADR is aDominant Trend in the Workplace, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453 (2000) (touting the use of ADRincluding mediation as a tool to handle workplace disputes); Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation,
and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583 (suggesting the value of mediating Title VII claims and
the use of employee caucuses to assist individual employees in the process).
41. See Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When The Defendantis Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate Treatment and UnjustifiedDisparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225 (2003) (describing the value of agreements
reached through transformative mediation of employment discrimination claims); Aimee Gourlay &Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational ConflictManagement Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1998) (advocating the use of
mediation but suggesting that it should be part of an overall conflict resolution system developed as
early as possible); Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305 (2001)(asserting that mediation of employment discrimination charges filed with the EEOC should be
mandatory to reap the benefits of more participation by parties and in reducing the EEOC's backlog);Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving SexualHarassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (1999) (suggesting the value of mediating sexualharassment claims); Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV.431 (1996) (describing the value of mediating disability discrimination claims); Lamont Stallworth et
al., Discrimination in the Workplace: How Mediation Can Help, DIsp. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2001, at 35(suggesting that employers and federal legislation can help resolve employment discrimination disputesby encouraging the use of mediation); Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual
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Likewise, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the agency charged with enforcing Title VII, has enthusiastically endorsed
the use of mediation to resolve employment discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC.43 Mediation represents a very satisfactory mechanism for
resolving employment discrimination disputes according to the parties
involved in charges filed with the EEOC. In a 2000 report, An Evaluation
of the EEOC Mediation Program,4 participants in the EEOC mediation
program expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the process.
45  The
report also stated that "nine out of 10 participants (96% of employers and
91% of charging parties) indicated that they would be willing to participate
in EEOC's mediation program again ...[r]egardless of the outcome of
their mediation.
46
After the initial expansion of arbitration into employment
discrimination claims in the early 1990s, mediation has now clearly become
a key ADR tool in resolving Title VII claims. As one travels along the road
to mediation of employment discrimination claims, new issues are starting
to arise because this process involves the privatization of a public dispute
resolution system created by Congress to effectuate the goals of Title VII.
Although individual employers and employees may continue to draw upon
the benefits of a system that allows them to circumvent the dangers of the
court system, broader questions about the abilities of the mediation process
Harassment Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489 (1997) (advocating the use of
mediation in sexual harassment disputes). But see Matt A. Mayer, The Use of Mediation in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 153 (asserting the public value of court litigation and
questioning the use of mediation as a tool to resolve employment discrimination disputes).
42. See Cheryl L. Dolder, The Contribution of Mediation to Workplace Justice, 33 INDUS. L.J.
320, 330-31 (2004) (describing the increasing use of mediation for workplace disputes in England);
Stemlight, supra note 30, at 1449-50 (describing same).
43. See Robert E. Talbot, A Practical Guide to Representing Parties in EEOC Mediations, 37
U.S.F.L. REV. 627, 628-30 (2003) (lauding the EEOC's mediation program); Butcher, supra note 41, at
257-58 (describing the EEOC's mediation program); Julie Harders, Too Good To Last? Budget Cuts
Force the EEOC to Terminate Contract Mediators From its New, Highly Touted Program, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 2000, at 30; EEOC's Mediation Program Going Strong Despite Budget Shortfall, Coordinators
Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at B-I (Mar. 27, 2000); Stallworth et al., supra note 41, at 83-84;
see also Matthew A. Swendiman, Note, The EEOC Mediation Program: Panacea or Panicked
Reaction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391 (2000) (describing benefits of the EEOC mediation
program).
44. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM 1 (2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/
report/index.html. For a full description of the research methodology used, see chapter five of the
report, http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/chapter5.html.
45. See Press Release, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC Mediation Program
Scores High Marks in Major Survey of Participants (Sep. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9- 2 6 -OO.html.
46. Id.; see also Berger, supra note 17, at 512 (finding that in employment mediation "many
participants express contentment with the process-sometimes even without obtaining money or other
tangible rewards").
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to provide societal justice are starting to percolate with a focus on what the
mediator can and should do to make sure that mediation agreements
somehow comply with legal norms that would apply in the public court
system.
Many critics have bemoaned the decreasing use of the public court
system as a tool for justice due to the increasing use of ADR.47 Bryant
Garth has provided an interesting critique of ADR by asserting that our
legal justice system has evolved into a merged private and public system for
the "elite that have a full array of alternatives, including the federal courts,
which they can use for tactical and other reasons" while we have "created alow-end justice for the rank and file."48 All of this is happening at a time
when commentators are debating about the concern that jury trials may be
headed to a vanishing point.49
III.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION MEDIATION EXAMINED
UNDER THE LENS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE:
EXPECTING A TRANSFORMATIVE PIPEDREAM
WHILE TILTING AT NEUTRALITY WINDMILLS
The growth of ADR from its initial focus on arbitration to its currently
strong preference for mediation makes sense for employment claims given
47. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1359; Delgado, supra note 1; Delgado, Conflict as
Pathology, supra note 8; Delgado, supra note 10; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1085 (1984) (analyzing adjudication in terms of public values that are threatened by settlement and
ADR processes); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.1545 (1991) (criticizing the use of mediation in domestic relations disputes instead of the court system);
Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1987) (asserting that certain public interests must be protected when implementing
private ADR programs); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993)(criticizing the focus on informal resolutions for seeking harmony rather than being concerned aboutjustice); Ralph Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15, 20-
21 & n.211 (1987) (describing the value of litigation options, including the jury system, as a deterrent tofurther wrongdoing and as a public communication vehicle to expose a wrongdoer); Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors?: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 211 (1995) (lamenting the continued decrease in court resolution of disputes). See
generally Stempel, Fuzziness, supra note 16 (describing recent analysis of trends in dispute resolution
and highlighting the critiques of "litigation romanticists" and contrasting those views with those who
still see the value of ADR).
48. Bryant Garth, Tilting The Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented
Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 932 (2002).
49. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial: More and More Cases are Settled, Mediated
or Arbitrated Without a Public Resolution. Will the Trend Harm the Justice System?, A.B.A. J., Oct.
2002, at 24. Marc Galanter has completed a study of the vanishing trial and suggested implications.
Marc S. Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, I J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
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the high levels of stakeholder satisfaction. But satisfaction results may not
represent societal justice, especially when an employee lacks legal
representation and bargaining power.5 ° Nevertheless, when employers and
employees can find common ground to craft their own resolution in
mediation, it offers some degree of privacy and certainty that might be more
important to the parties than the delivery of a just result based upon societal
standards or legal norms. Because of a focus on the needs of the parties in
private mediation rather than society's need to eradicate workplace
discrimination, concerns about justice in mediation have become an issue
along with the power of the mediator to control the parties.
To the extent there is a concern about the need for justice in mediation,
no universal agreement has arisen as to what the definition of justice in
mediation should encompass." Because it depends on the private
agreement of the parties,52 by its nature, mediation will only address private
norms and default positions under contract law rather than the norms to be
enforced by broader societal concepts of justice and public policy.53
Jonathan Hyman and Lela Love recently explored the full gamut of possible
issues of justice in mediation. Without coming up with a single definition,
they explored several possibilities for justice that may be meted out through
mediation, including reparative justice, distributive justice, transformative
justice, and procedural justice, to name a few.54 According to Hyman and
Love, the goals of justice in mediation come from the parties and not from
the law.55 They posit that the mediator's role regarding justice arises when
the "parties seek to satisfy their sense of fairness and justice."56 At that
point, the mediator should try to "understand the [justice] claim with the
same kind of empathetic response that she brings to each party's feelings
and interests."57 Then, without needing to agree with a party's assessment
50. See Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 8, at 1395-96 (describing how satisfied users
may mask bargaining power differentials); Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-And
of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 538-39 (1997) (describing the needs of participants
in mediation for more information when there are bargaining power differentials or lack of legal
representation).
51. Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in
Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 162-74 (2002) (describing various forms of justice that may be
arguably achieved through mediation including reparative justice, distributive justice, transformative
justice, and procedural justice).
52. See Scott Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing
Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REv. 227, 230-31 (2003) (asserting that "in
private mediations, the parties create the mediator's role by agreement").
53. Id. at 231 n.10, 234 (describing how agreements to mediate can define the role and duties of
the mediator and how such contracts operate under default rules that the parties can alter under general
contract law principles).
54. Hyman & Love, supra note 51, at 162-74.
55. Id. at 161 n.5.
56. Id. at 165.
57. Id.
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of justice, the mediator should "be able to articulate the meaning of justice
as the party sees it, and help the party think through his ideas in ways that
might lead to a resolution." 8
A. Concerns About Mediators Pushing Their Own Views
of Justice in Mediation
Based on his experience in representing clients in employment
discrimination mediation and other admitted "biases," James Coben has
recently expressed great concern about the acts of mediators, leading him
"to take a dark view of the quality of justice delivered in mediation."59 His
concerns result from experiences with mediators who "incorrectly evaluate.
• . clients' cases, and their strong push for particular settlement structures
while simultaneously proclaiming process neutrality."6  These concerns
can be ameliorated if the focus of the mediator becomes limited to merely
what the parties need and want rather than what the mediator wants. At
first blush, this may appear to be an overly simplistic suggestion. However,
recognizing the significance of mediator approach and orientation along
with the ability of the mediator to influence the parties by losing focus has
not garnered enough attention of commentators. Accordingly, any efforts
to use mediation in resolving Title VII claims must recognize theimportance of power differentials, cultural dynamics, and other societal
concerns involved with the resolution of a claim brought under a federal
statute banning employment discrimination. Mediators must be careful so
that they do not abuse their power under the guise of delivering justice and
turn mediation into another tool for the powerful or the haves to destroy the
rights of the powerless or have-nots in our society.6'
58. Id.
59. James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator ValuesBeyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 66 (2004).
60. Id. at 65.
61. In the early 1980s, many law and society commentators criticized ADR and lamented that it
was being offered as a form of informal second-class justice merely for the have-nots in our society. SeeSusan M. Olson and Albert W. Dzur, Revisiting Informal Justice: Restorative Justice and Democratic
Professionalism, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 139, 141 (2004) (citing works by RICHARD L. ABEL, TheContradictions of Informal Justice, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL. 1: THE AMERICANEXPERIENCE (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Roman Tomasic, Mediation as an Alternative to Adjudication:Rhetoric and Reality in the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT
OF AN EMERGING IDEA (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm Feeley eds., 1982); Sally Engle Merry, DefiningSuccess in the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN
EMERGING IDEA, supra; Sally Engle Merry, Myth and Practice in the Mediation Process, in MEDIATION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VICTIMS, OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY (M. Wright & B. Galaway, eds.,1989); Richard Hofrichter, Justice Centers Raise Basic Questions, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE:ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA, supra; Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the SocialControl Problems ofAmerican Capitalism: A Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL.1: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra; CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY
AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); and Delgado et al., supra note 47).
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Proponents for mediation should not get caught up in the wave of
enthusiasm and bliss surrounding ADR62 and start rushing to suggest that
mediators should deliver social justice in accord with the goal of Title VII
to eradicate workplace discrimination. By "social justice," I am referring to
both "distributive and relational" attributes along with procedural aspects.
63
Mediation, by its nature, represents a creature of contract and the mediator
should only focus on accomplishing what the parties want not what the
mediator wants.64 But there is nothing to stop mediators from using their
power solely for their own interests and not the interests of the parties.
Because of that potential for abuse of power, a mediator should determine
what the expectations of the parties are in each individual situation and act
accordingly in helping them resolve their conflict based upon that
determination.65
The concern about the have-nots in our legal system has been addressed by Marc Galanter. 
See
generally Galanter, supra note 5. For a more recent discussion and application of this matter to ADR,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves " Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat
Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999).
62. See Stempel, Fuzziness, supra note 16, at 309 (noting how "much ADR scholarship has been
fluffy, overly romantic about ADR, or vague in its observations and prescriptions" and arguing 
that
"[miuch too much ADR scholarship has the tone of cultist conversion, religious fervor, or infatuation
with all that is not litigation" especially given that "much of the literature of mediation and ADR 
is
almost Pollyannaish in its unalloyed optimism-cum-boosterism").
63. See John 0. Calmore, "Chasing the Wind": Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal Mis-
Education, and Engaging in Professional Resocialization, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1176 n.30 (2004)
(defining social justice "to embrace both fairness and equity in the distribution of a wide range of
attributes, which need not be confined to material things" (quoting DAVID SMITH, GEOGRAPHY AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 26 (1994)). Under this definition of justice, there is a "primary focus .. on attributes
which have an immediate bearing on people's lives," so that "our conception of social justice goes
beyond patterns of distribution, general and spatial, to incorporate attributes relevant to how these come
about" and it also focuses on concerns about both "fairness ... applied to procedures and justice to
outcomes." Id.
64. See Weckstein, supra note 50, at 506-07 & nn. 15-16 (referring to norm-generating mediators
who "avoid explicit consideration of social norms, thus vesting the parties with maximum discretion to
resolve their dispute with or without reference to any standards beyond their personal preferences" or 
to
norm-educating mediators who try "to assure that disputants are aware of information concerning
applicable law and other relevant data" but "may differ in the proper method of communicating 
this
information to the parties" because they may "suggest that each party consult appropriate legal or expert
counsel" or "with concurrence of the parties" they get approval to bring in a "third-party ... expert to
educate the disputants" (citing Ellen Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F.L. REV. 723, 733-34 (1996))).
65. See Stemlight, supra note 17, at 297 (criticizing those "who opine on dispute resolution issues
[as] hav[ing] a tendency to say that they or we know what disputants really want, when in fact the
evidence is quite sparse" so the arguments that parties want an adversary process or that they feel "trials
are terrible" or that they want a "conciliated, non-legal solution to a trial" are all merely unsubstantiated
assumptions). Professor Stemlight suggests that we need research to find out what parties want and
asserts that research "will ultimately show that disputants are generally looking for three benefits from a
dispute resolution system: (1) a system that provides them with a substantively fair/just result; (2) a
system that meets the procedural justice criteria of voice, participation, and dignity as set out above; and
(3) a system that helps them to achieve other personal and emotional goals, such as reconciliation, or
that at least does not leave them feeling worse, emotionally and psychologically." Id. at 299.
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Some believe that a mediator can help the parties transform their
relationship as a form of therapeutic jurisprudence or justice.66 However,
this assumption that mediation can transform the parties' relationship
represents too much about what the mediator wants and assumes withoutknowing that this is what the parties want.67 A mediator should not come in
with a predetermined expectation of providing social justice or of
transforming the parties' relationship or of knowing how a particular type
of dispute can be best resolved.68 Lofty goals of transforming the parties'
relationships are certainly legitimate bargaining chips for parties in
mediation, but they should only be pursued by the mediator afterdetermining that those goals represent the parties' goals in achieving some
resolution to their conflict. 69 Otherwise, the mediator can stray from party
self-determination and become too enthralled with what the mediator thinks
is best for the parties even when that is not what the parties want.
66. See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple ModelApproach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997); Waldman, supra note 15; see also Reuben, supra note 39, at59 (describing this "therapeutic approach"). As part of the transformative mediation bandwagon, theU.S. Postal Service has adopted this form of mediation. See James R. Antes et al., TransformingConflict Interactions in the Workplace: Documented Effects of the USPS REDRESS® Program, 18HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 429 (2001) (describing the USPS transformative mediation program forhandling employment disputes); Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation inEmployment Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 341, 356 & n.89 (2002) (noting thePostal Service's choice of transformative mediation and defining it as involving "a unique potential fortransforming people-engendering moral growth-by helping them wrestle with difficult circumstances
and bridge human differences, in the very midst of conflict" (citing ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPHP. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT ANDRECOGNITION 2 (1994), which first articulated the transformative mediation approach)); CynthiaHallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: Lessons Learned from Swimming
Upstream, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375 (2001).
67. 1 believe that those who purport to call themselves transformative mediators have become tooexcited about the press clippings, alleged mysticism, and their own hyperbole regarding transformative
mediation. Therefore, I agree with Stephen Subrin, who recently stated his doubts about mediatorsbeing able to operate under and deliver on promises to transform parties:
I am quite sure that if transformative mediators told clients and lawyers engaged in litigationthat the purpose of the mediation, for which the clients were to pay, was to empower theclients and make them recognize the humanity of their opposing side, they would lose a gooddeal of business. The idea that empowerment and recognition is why most folks want to enterinto mediation does not ring true.... Moreover, the likelihood that most human beings willsubstantially change, be transformed, by some hours of mediation is most unlikely. Talk toanalysts or other mental health professionals. Think about how easy it is to alter your own
thoughts and behavior.
Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n. 119.
68. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and DemocraticDefense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2694 n. 139 (1995) (arguing that it is unlikelythat we can assign a particular type of dispute to a particular process before the dispute arises).
69. Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n. 119 (asserting that transformative mediators would "lose agood deal of business" if they told their paying clients that their intention was to transform the parties'
relationship and "[i]f transformative mediators do not tell their clients what their ... agenda is ... it is
unfair to those who come to them and pay them").
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B. Repeat Players in Mediation as a Justice Concern
If we return to the problem in the prologue of this Article, the difficulty
for Walter in finding an attorney represents one issue that should be
highlighted. Employers and their counsel are repeat players in having to
resolve employment discrimination disputes. Individual employees may
only have one shot in their careers at resolving an employment
discrimination dispute and this difficulty becomes exacerbated when
operating without legal counsel.
Employers, acting as repeat players, have the resources to set norms in
the disputing process. Their power in relation to a one-shot disputant
presents concerns about the fairness of resolving a dispute in a forum where
one party has this repeat player advantage. In Marc Galanter's landmark
analysis of legal disputes, he predicted that like kinds (repeat players with
repeat players and one-shot disputants with one-shot disputants) would be
less likely to use the court system and more likely to employ the benefits of
privatized systems because of their somewhat equal resources. 70  An
underlying normative principle in his analysis assumes that the dispute
resolution system used can and should provide distributive justice in fairly
allocating resources.7 '
Galanter's suggested solution to address the disparity in the court
system when a party has the repeat player advantage is to provide more
mechanisms so that have-nots (one-shot disputants) become more like
repeat players by obtaining repeat player resources in the court system.72
Although Galanter suggested changes to the formal court system to
accomplish his distributive justice goal, he failed to appreciate the influence
of politics as these social justice efforts have been rebuffed by the court
system and its judges.73
Even while repeat player advantages continue for employers in the
court system, employers have opted to use ADR in more situations-a
70. Galanter, supra note 5, at 124-26 (referring to what we now call ADR as "Alternatives To The
Official System"); see id. at 108 (describing how most one-shot versus one-shot disputes are "pseudo-
litigation" where the parties have worked out a settlement that is ratified in the guise of adjudication or
that it involves fights with overtones of "spite" and "irrationality" and it involves few appeals); id. at
144 (finding that private dispute resolution will be preferred when both parties are repeat players).
71. Galanter actually refers to justice possibilities as "redistributive." Id. at 95 (asserting that "the
basic architecture of the legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means
of redistributive (that is, systemically equalizing) change"); id. at 150 (noting the difficulties with
litigation in being "unlikely to shape decisively the distribution of power in society"); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 61, at 20 (describing Galanter's approach to finding out whether redistributive justice can be
achieved in litigation).
72. Galanter, supra note 5, at 135-48 (suggesting reforms including collective actions and broader
remedies).
73. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 29-30 (noting that Galanter's analysis failed to appreciate
the political factors that would be necessary to make the court system respond to his social and
distributive justice goals).
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choice that seems to reflect little thought about their repeat player
advantage in the courts.74 That is, unless the use of ADR presents just
another stronger and private system for the employer haves. The real
advantage in being the haves represents the ability "to choose and
manipulate what process will be used to enforce substantive rights" because
"advantages ...will flow to the repeat player who controls virtually all
aspects of the disputing process."75 Recognizing the potential for abuse in a
dispute resolution setting dominated by an employer, the issue becomes
whether anything can be done to rectify the repeat player advantage in the
private dispute resolution setting.76
Despite the difficulties presented by repeat player issues, some
advocates believe that mediators can help provide justice.77 Under the
Galanter hypothesis, the fairest dispute resolution system involves parties
with similar resources such as repeat players versus repeat players or one-
shot disputant versus one-shot disputant. When there is a repeat player
resource advantage, the dispute resolution system must undergo certain
changes to provide more resources to the one-shotter to level the dispute
resolution playing field.78 Similar to Galanter's attempts to make the
litigation process provide more repeat player resources for one-shot
litigants, the design of the mediation system for employment discrimination
matters must allow more repeat player resources for individual one-shot
employee participants. This means removing some of the repeat player
advantages in legal resources by making sure employees have legal counsel
74. See generally Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From Using
Mandatory Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 443-62 (2000) (questioning
the increasing use of arbitration by employers for handling employment discrimination claims when
they handily win in courts as a disconnect between employers and their counsel over fees).
75. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 26, 34; see also Berger, supra note 17, at 533 (noting how
employers benefit "from being a 'repeat player' in mediation and from its ability to hire superior legal
assistance"); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on
Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 767, 768-69
(1996) (referring to a repeat player effect in mediation).
76. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 37; see also Lauren Edelman & Mark Suchman, When the
"'Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 941, 949-53, 961, 965 (1999) (suggesting that when companies and corporations internalize their
disputes they transcend the repeat player problem in the litigation process by becoming "nothing less
than the playing field itself' and asserting that despite "the best intentions of individual officials.
organizational dispute processing forums are rarely level ground").
77. See Lela P. Love, Preface to the Justice in Mediation Symposium, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 59, 62 (2004) (suggesting the problems with justice and repeat players in mediation); see also
Coben, supra note 59, at 70 n.25, 77 n.57 (raising the concern about justice in mediation when dealing
with repeat players). Professor Love has also asserted that justice must play a role in mediation. Lela P.
Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. Disp. REsOL. L.J. 29 (2001); Hyman & Love, supra note 51, at 159 n.1
(raising the importance of justice in mediation but noting the difficulty of defining what justice in
mediation would look like).
78. Galanter, supra note 5, at 144.
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(who are also repeat players in mediation),79 ensuring that employees have
fair and balanced selection processes for the mediators, and providing
employees the opportunity to select diverse mediators who do not represent
repeat player advantages for the employer.80 With these concerns in place
when considering the design of the mediation system, certain worries, if
any, about justice in mediation based on any repeat player problem can be
addressed.81
C. The Intersection of Private Mediation,
Mediator Neutrality/Activism & Justice
1. Attempting to Understand Justice in Private Mediation:
At a Minimum, the Guarantee of Procedural Safeguards
What kind of justice should be delivered in mediation remains an
academic pursuit rather than a focus on actual disputants' expectations in
mediation.82 Regardless, even if the dispute resolution system is objectively
fair, it will not work when it is perceived as unfair because of procedural
justice concerns.8 3  Professor Nancy Welsh has added a significant
79. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 34 n.71, 37 (identifying disadvantages for "employment
claimants" in ADR who are "one shot claimants with one-shot or 'new to the territory' lawyers" and
describing how "lawyers themselves who routinely appear in ADR proceedings may be repeat players in
all of the ways originally documented by Galanter"). The repeat player lawyer concern has been raised
in the employment arbitration context. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect, I EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 197-200 (1997) (discussing lawyers as repeat players in
employment arbitration and noting that it is very unlikely that even a "less able" plaintiffs' lawyer will
become a repeat player lawyer in employment arbitration); Estreicher, Saturns, supra note 33, at 566
("[T]he real repeat players in arbitration are not the parties themselves but the lawyers involved.").
80. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 34 n.71, 35-36 (describing "challenge[s] [to] the bias
of presumed repeat player [neutrals] who are thought to represent the repeat player interest of securities
brokers or the securities industry or who are too homogeneous demographically and sufficiently
representative of claimants"); see also Berger, supra note 17, at 533 (describing repeat player problem);
but see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 34 n.71 (asserting that "employment claimants" who use a
"repeat play plaintiffs lawyer" or "specialized lawyers" with "some knowledge or 'consent' to the use
of an ADR provider who is effective" may be an advantage).
81. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 46 ("issues of fairness and advantage can be dealt with
by program or system design" and describing the Brown and Root Company dispute resolution system
in which "attempts to minimize repeat player advantage by having costs (of the arbitration, of claimant's
lawyer's fees, and of some of the witness fees) paid for by the employer and by utilizing a multitiered
program in which employees use internal grievances..., nonbinding mediation, or internal conferences,
and then finally binding arbitration").
82. See Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on
Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 102 (asserting the need for further research about the
impacts of dispute resolution); Hensler, supra note 39, at 95 (arguing for more research about the
fairness for disputants who use ADR); Stemlight, supra note 17, at 297.
83. Sternlight, supra note 17, at 297; see also Bingham et al., supra note 66, at 345-46 (noting that
"organizational decisions will be more readily accepted if the processes by which they are achieved are
perceived to be fair" and how "researchers have found that employee satisfaction is more strongly
influenced by the perceived fairness of the grievance procedure than by the perceived fairness of the
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contribution to the meaning of procedural justice in mediation through her
writings.8 "  If the procedures employed during mediation provide
participants with an opportunity to be heard by a fairly selected and
representative neutral,85 and to have their voices recognized, then this form
of procedural justice may result in a high degree of satisfaction for
participants even if it does not really address broader social justice concerns
or guarantee the application of legal norms.16  Focusing on "process
elements-voice, consideration, even-handedness and dignity"87  allow
dispute resolution systems to "meet disputants' desires for proceduraljustice without having third-party neutrals make factual and legal
determinations."88 Accordingly, mediators can orient themselves towards
delivering procedural justice by paying attention to party opportunities to be
heard and treated with respect and dignity in the process without affecting
the parties' self-determination about how to resolve their dispute.
2. Mediation's Scope: Mediator Orientation Guided By Party Self-
Determination
i. Defining Mediator Orientations
Although justice is hard to define, explaining mediation provides no
easy task either. One might easily understand mediation as "an informal,
consensual process in which a neutral third party, without power to impose
a settlement assists disputing parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory
resolution."89 Although there are a number of approaches and explanations
available, I like the definition of mediation as "a social process in which a
grievance outcome"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 61 ("As the procedural justice literature has
told us, parties may be content with an ability to be heard by a third person neutral if they are convinced
the process is otherwise fair.").
84. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
573 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow
Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179 [hereinafter, Welsh, Decision Control];
Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2001); Nancy A. Welsh, Making
Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With I?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001)
[hereinafter, Welsh, Making Deals].
85. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 47 n. 116 ("Clearly, the perceived fairness of such a
program depends on the perceived fairness and diversity of the mediators ... ").
86. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 84; see also Bingham et al., supra note 66, at 357
(describing the transformative model of mediation employed by the United States Post Office in
employment discrimination claims and how that model is consistent with procedural justice by
"emphasizing opportunities for voice and control").
87. Sternlight, supra note 17, at 298 (quoting Welsh, Decision Control, supra note 84, at 187).
88. Id. (quoting Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 84, at 838-58).
89. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Without Law, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 52-53 (1996).
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third party helps people in conflict understand their situation and decide for
themselves what, if anything, to do about it."90 This definition places much
more emphasis on the party determination role and the necessary orientation
for the mediator to play a very deferential role in that process.
Mediators can adopt various styles depending upon the situation at
hand.9  There are typically either two or three types of mediator
orientations: evaluative, transformative, and facilitative.9 2  With the
"evaluative" mediation approach, the mediator focuses on the parties' legal
dispute by analyzing the constraints of the law involved and assessing the
relative strengths of each side's legal position to assist the parties in
reaching a resolution. 93 In contrast, in facilitative mediation, the mediator
does not "give evaluations nor ... suggest settlement options" and instead
focuses on getting "conversation moving in the direction of settlement."
94
In transformative mediation, the expectation is that the process may
"generate transformative effects ... that are highly valuable for the parties
and for society" by allowing "the parties to make real connections across
ingroups. . . that ... can lead to changed attitudes that will spill over into
other areas."95
Some commentators have asserted that transformative mediation is
really a subset of facilitative mediation, which would leave only two
primary types, facilitative and evaluative. 96 However, unlike facilitative or
evaluative mediation, transformative mediation is "not premised upon
forcing the participants to settle."97 Regardless, I am particularly skeptical
of the assumptions related to the so-called transformative mediation
90. Dorothy J. Della Noce et al., Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation:
Implications for Practice and Policy, 3 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 39, 39 (2002).
91. See generally Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and Why-Legal Mediators
Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 41 (arguing that mediators in legal disputes
often change styles many times throughout the process and it is necessary to do so when mediating legal
disputes); Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Qualifications, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid
for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13-16, 35-36, 40-41 & nn.90-91 (1996) (referring to
various techniques employed by mediators).
92. Dolder, supra note 42, at 332-33; Zena Zumeta, A Facilitative Mediator Responds, 2000 J.
DiSP. RESOL. 335, 335.
93. Yelnosky, supra note 40, at 601.
94. Butcher, supra note 41, at 256.
95. Id. at 260.
96. Stempel, supra note 14, at 384 ("[Ajlthough transformative purists will probably disagree, I
have generally regarded transformative mediation as a subset of facilitative mediation."); Talbot, supra
note 43, at 652 (referring to "two basic styles, or approaches, that mediators follow: the facilitative
approach and the directive approach" with the facilitative approach being "called an 'interest based' or
'transformative approach"' and "the directive approach, also called an 'evaluative' or 'rights-based'
approach").
97. Butcher, supra note 41, at 256.
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approach98 because the glow of it transcends the focus on doing what the
parties want and can become more of a focus on what the mediator wants.99
Nevertheless, transformative mediation has been consistently used by the
largest civilian employer in this country, the United States Postal Service.°0
Although it has been argued that this program was desired by the client,'0 ' it
represents the desires of only one of the clients, the employer who selected
that framework, not the individual employees in each dispute.
Whether a mediator is facilitative, evaluative, or transformative
appears to be more of a concern among academics without regard to actual
practices employed by mediators.0 2 These various approaches to mediation
merely identify a number of skills that a mediator may employ depending
on the particular situation at hand and should not become a set
98. See Della Noce et al., supra note 90, at 51 (noting that this "model assumes that the
transformation of interaction [between parties] itself is what matters most to parties in conflict-even
more than settlement on favorable terms"); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope,
Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and Practice of Transformative Mediation,
3 PEPP. DIsp. RESOL. L.J. 67 (2002).
99. See Jeffrey R. Seul, How Transformative is Transformative Mediation?: A Constructive-
Developmental Assessment, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 135, 157-67 (1999) (describing limitations
of the transformative mediation approach); Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n.119. (criticizing the
transformative mediation approach).
100. Della Noce et al., supra note 90, at 52 (describing the development of transformative
mediation with the United States Postal Service (USPS) in handling its employment disputes). For more
detailed descriptions of the results from the USPS transformative mediation program called REDRESS,
see Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS REDRESS Program:
Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399 (2001); Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Handling Workplace Conflict: Why Transformative Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367
(2001); Hallberlin, supra note 66.
101. Della Noce et al., supra note 90, at 58 ("To borrow the rhetoric of the field, transformative
mediation was what the client wanted.").
102. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for
Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 949 (1997)(asserting that various academic arguments about whether one approach to mediation is better than
another is the wrong focus and that the focus should be on which approach is more appropriate under the
circumstances or even if a mixture of the approaches may be appropriate depending on the needs of the
disputants in that situation); see also Stempel, Fuzziness, supra note 16, at 310 (arguing "that the legal
profession is better off addressing the pragmatic operational question of mediation and other disputing
devices rather than arguing over what constitutes "true" or "acceptable" mediation"); see also Richard
Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 309, 319 (asserting
that the evaluative and facilitative distinction should no longer be a focus as there are many more
pressing concerns about the use of mediation); Stempel, supra note 14, at 379 n.23 (describing a debate
about whether "reality testing" through pointed questioning as facilitative mediation versus "neutral
evaluation" by specifically asserting a concern about an option rather than doing it through questioning
and whether this alleged distinction really suggests that "fidelity to a term or theoretical concept can get
in the way of real world applications of ADR"). But see John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated
Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 321 (asserting the importance of the facilitative approach to
mediation in establishing key values for mediators); Stempel, supra note 14, at 380, 388 (finding some
value in the facilitative-evaluative debate as the academic community invested in the facilitative
approach can operate as a check on those mediators who view their roles as omnipotent evaluators).
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orientation. °3 Instead, the mediator's orientation should be to discover and
focus on what the parties want and decide how to help them find possible
agreement by exploring their mutual interests.
Accordingly, the actual orientation should be one of self-actualization
for the parties. It does not involve a focus on settlement or changing
relationships unless that is what the parties want. What I refer to as the
Self-Actualizing Party mediator or SAP mediator does not assume that he
or she will achieve such lofty goals as therapeutic jurisprudence' 4 or social
justice 5 or even transforming relationships of the parties unless the parties'
needs suggest that accomplishing these goals would be of value in the
mediation. The focus of the SAP mediator is to assess what the parties'
needs are and then act accordingly. 6
ii. Matching Orientations with Realistic Mediation Parameters
Jeffrey Stempel correctly notes that "odes to ADR and the anti-
conflict, anti-judgmental rhetoric is too fuzzy," and that it rarely focuses on
how "litigation and ADR activities actually function."'0 7  Stempel also
argues that despite being "surrounded by large doses of rhetoric about
freedom and self-determination ... ADR, in practice, reflects insufficient
examination of the degree of freedom actually in evidence and the degree to
which it is mal-distributed according to class, status, wealth, race, and
gender."'0 8 Based upon these concerns, the mediator's role is to figure out
what the parties want and see if there is a possibility of helping the parties
reach a mutual agreement about how to resolve their conflict. Providing
opportunities for procedural fairness is all the justice that a mediator can
deliver without knowing the parties' goals and while still acting under the
parameter of party self-determination. Mediation must be flexible to
103. See Cindy Fazzi, A Mediation Style That Combines Many Others Situational Mediation:
Sensible Conflict Resolution, DisP. RESOL. J., July 2004, at 86 (reviewing book by Oliver Ross,
describing situational approach to mediation as combining all the various styles and applying them when
needed depending upon the situation at hand).
104. See Waldman, supra note 15.
105. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Know Justice, Know Peace: Further Reflections on Justice, Equality
and Impartiality in Settlement Oriented and Transformative Mediations, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 87, 95 (2004) (arguing that mediators must not just be "conflict stoppers" but must also be
charged with serving justice).
106. See Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1017,
1041-42 (2004) (describing Maslow's hierarchy of needs). According to Robert Creo, mediators must
decide what are "critical and actual tipping points for the decision makers" and how Maslow's pyramid
of needs listed from "top to bottom: self-actualization; esteem; love (social); safety; physiological"
demonstrate non-linear bases for decision making and how the lower level needs are the ones that most
people focus on and are the most dominant needs even though truly healthy people will then seek the
highest level of need, self-actualization. Id.
107. Stempel, Fuzziness, supra note 16, at 353.
108. Id.
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address the situation at hand rather than hindered by some formalistic
orientation or predetermined approach to mediation." 9
Regardless of all the possible mediator orientations discussed and thejustifications for them, the reality is that even mediators do not always
readily recognize when they apply one of these various orientations when
mediating workplace disputes."0  Accordingly, it is incumbent upon
mediators to focus consciously on their approaches before applying any of
these orientations. Mediators should consider how their behavior can match
certain "cardinal virtues [within the parameters of the mediation] process
[which] can be self-determination, autonomy, empowerment,
transformation, and efficiency. ' .' Of course, a mediator must continue to
"reality-test" with the parties through questioning to make sure the mediator
has not adopted an orientation that the parties do not desire. Professor
Nolan-Haley has explained the parameters of mediation as follows:
Unlike decision making by a neutral third party in the adjudication process,
decision making in mediation rests solely with the disputing parties. Some
commentators consider mediation to be a fairer process than adjudication
because the affected parties have complete authority in selecting what
values will govern the resolution of their dispute. Finally, mediation is
thought to result in greater litigant satisfaction as compared to judicial
adjudication of disputes. There has been a significant amount of scholarly
activity directed toward testing and validating these assumptions ....
Conventional wisdom concerning mediation holds that substantive law
is not dispositive in the mediation process-it operates simply as a template
to show what might be available in a more formal, legalistic setting. Instead
of law, free-standing normative standards govern in mediation, and parties
actually affected by a dispute decide what factors should influence the
efforts to resolve that dispute. Thus, the moral reference point in mediation
is the self. Individualized notions of fairness, justice, morality, ethics, and
culture may trump the values associated with any objective framework
provided by law."
12
These parameters raise a number of questions with respect to justice in
mediation. One question is whether the mediator must take some
affirmative steps to insure legal fairness when one party involved in the
mediation is much more powerful than the other party. Is the mediator's
109. Stempel, supra note 14, at 376 (describing how "it may be that one 'size' of mediation does
not fit all" and asserting that mediation must allow "the mediator substantial discretion to do what he or
she thinks best in each particular case").
110. L. Camille Hebert, Establishing and Evaluating a Workplace Mediation Pilot Project: An
Ohio Case Study, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 415, 433 (1999) (describing how mediators and
parties view mediator's performance quite differently, with parties describing behavior that sounds very
much like evaluative mediation and mediators describing their behavior in ways that reflect the
facilitative mediation model).
11. Nolan-Haley, supra note 89, at 54.
112. Id. at 55-56 (footnotes omitted).
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role in facilitating negotiation to provide a level playing field? Would that
help facilitate negotiation or would the stronger party view the mediator as
being partial to the weaker party? Also, if the mediator tries to remain
allegedly neutral while facilitating negotiation, does that mean the mediator
has merely operated as a tool for the stronger party to hammer the weaker
party? Should a mediator be concerned about these issues and, if so, what
can or should a mediator do? Further, should the mediator seek to
transform the parties' relationship when all the parties want is a way to
quickly settle their dispute?
However, these questions are extraordinarily difficult to answer and
ultimately it is unnecessary to do so. They should not be the focus for a
mediator in an employment dispute. Given that mediation is a process
"heralded because of its focus on self-determination," it is strange "for
ADR scholars to advocate bright-line, legalistic rules to remedy problems"
created in that process."3 Other than refusing to go forward with the
mediation, a mediator cannot achieve substantial distributive justice unless
the parties agree to it or it is part of the system design. And imposing the
mediator's view of distributive or social justice raises major concerns when
operating under the cloak of private dispute resolution. The informal
mediation process does not provide for the type of public scrutiny and
application of societal norms that a distributive justice system would
warrant. Instead, this form of justice would involve the mediator's own
assessment of what is just in that particular situation given the mediator's
understanding of how to distribute resources based upon societal and legal
norms even if that assessment is a wrong assessment of societal or legal
norms, and it would clearly conflict with or be contrary to the desires of the
parties and the overriding goal of party self-determination.
3. Dealing With Power Imbalances: Ignoring Neutrality Myths and
Pursuing Mediator Activism Solely for Party Self-Determination
i. The Realities of Mediator Neutrality
When issues of power imbalance' between parties exist, some believe
that it becomes an issue of major concern for the mediator. As one
commentator has recently explained:
This presents a real dilemma for the mediator; if the third party intervenes
to rectify power imbalance this may give rise to an accusation of bias
113. See Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension
Between The Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 550 (2004).
114. See Jordi Agusti-Panareda, Power Imbalances in Mediation: Questioning Some Assumptions,
DisP. RESOL. J., July 2004, at 24.
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against the controlling party. If he or she omits to do anything, the failure
to act is likely to perpetuate the power disparity. This might lead to the
conclusion that if neutrality is equated with passivity, then just outcomes
will be more difficult to attain through the use of workplace mediation.
Moreover, an inexperienced or unaware mediator has the potential to create
more power imbalances than might be present in the first place if there is a
narrow perception of what constitutes neutrality.115
However, this dilemma represents a red herring under the guise of the
mediator neutrality myth.116 If mediators take a hands-off approach under
the guise of being neutral in an employment discrimination dispute, it could
likely involve perpetuating an imbalance of power between the weaker
employee party and the stronger employer party.117 Instead, if you look at
self-determination as the goal for what the parties want, no weaker party
would want the mediator to stand by passively and foster an agreement that
perpetuates bias."'
Some commentators have asserted that delivering just outcomes should
be a goal of mediation and society should step in to make sure that it occurs
in the mediation process.'19 However, a mediator's basis for intervention
115. Dolder, supra note 42, at 335-36.
116. Coben, supra note 59, at 73-74 (describing the "fiction" of neutrality and asserting "only in
the mythological world of mediation could silence ever be considered neutral"); Dolder, supra note 42,
at 337 (asserting that claims of mediator "neutrality are neither achievable nor desirable"); Wallace
Warfield, Building Consensus for Racial Harmony in American Cities: Case Model Approach, 1996 J.
DtSP. RESOL. 151, 157-58 (recognizing that, for third-party interveners in deep-rooted racial conflicts,
"neutrality" is a myth that cannot really exist); Weckstein, supra note 50, at 509-10 (describing how
some define mediation as requiring "that the mediator be neutral or impartial" and asserting that "it is
neither realistic in all cases nor an essential ingredient of the process").
117. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is this the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47, 71 (1991) (describing how the difficulty with the "hands-off
style, given the number of mediations that occur as a requirement of court-mandated procedures, may
lead to the perception that spending time in trying to facilitate is a waste of time); Berger, supra note 17,
at 533 (describing how "employment mediations generally.., do entail some power imbalance in favor
of defendants"); Dolder, supra note 42, at n.76 (citing Alfini and finding that "[a]llowing too much time
for empathising, refraining and the other tools in the successful facilitative mediator's tool box might be
perceived as weak and ineffective in a court-mandated environment"); see also Gunning, supra note
105, at 91-94 (lamenting the claims of those transformative mediators who claim they must do nothing
in the face of a potential imbalance of power as part of being neutral and suggesting that activism on the
part of mediators in those circumstances is necessary).
118. Weckstein, supra note 50, at 503, 511 (asserting that a party who "is unaware of relevant facts
or law that, if known, would influence that party's decision cannot engage in meaningful self-
determination").
119. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 374-75 & n.15 (referring to mediation as a defeat even if all the
parties are satisfied if the result does not adhere to legal norms, and asserting that mediation should not
go forward without some regulation because the best "slogan might be power to the parties, but not
absolute power to the parties or to any single party"); see also Sternlight, supra note 17, at 304 n.76
(asserting that "[b]ecause disputes and dispute resolution affect the public as well as disputants, I believe
this [the decision about whether a dispute is to be mediated] should be, in part, a societal decision, and
not merely left to disputants").
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should not rest upon reaching just outcomes as Stephen Subrin has
explained:
I think mediators should be extremely hesitant about ever saying what they
think the correct result of a mediation should be or what they think a judge
or jury would determine. The mediators will almost always lack
information. Even when one is dealing with her own client, a lawyer is not
quite sure she has the whole story of what the client knows, let alone what
the other clients and witnesses know. It is foolish to assume the parties and
lawyers tell the mediator everything they know that is relevant to a
settlement. So far as I have been able to determine, the skillful lawyer at a
mediation, as well as the skillful client or party without a lawyer, is doing
two things simultaneously: she is being an advocate trying to convince the
mediator of her position and to convince, or soften, the previous convictions
of the opposing parties and lawyers, and she is being cooperative and
sharing (or at least giving that appearance) in an attempt to gain a
settlement, and perhaps even increase the combined value of what can be
achieved through settlement. The advocacy part of the performance will not
permit all information to be placed either on the table or communicated to
the mediator confidentially. Even if the mediator knew everything, she
would be plagued with the uncertainties about litigation .... 20
Rather, any mediator intervention should only be based upon
accomplishing the mutual objectives of the parties. In some situations,
weaker parties may decide they want a result that the mediator may not
perceive as just. If, in the mind of the mediator, the weaker party is
deciding to pursue this result with informed consent, then the mediator's
role should be only to help foster a mutual agreement that will meet that
party's goals and provide procedural justice throughout the process.
In an effort to reconcile purported mediator neutrality with mediator
activism in the context of an employment dispute, Donald Weckstein has
argued that mediators should become activists to insure party empowerment
and self-determination.21 Weckstein also found that "employment
discrimination" disputes are best approached by norm-advocating
120. Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n. 123. Jeffrey Stempel, one of the advocates for using legal
norms in the mediation process, assumes that the foundation provided by the court system provides
adequate norms from which to draw upon in advocating certain norms in mediation. Stempel, supra
note 14, at 382 (noting his assumption that the default legal regime as a source of norms is an adequate
one). However, the default legal regime for employment discrimination law has been increasingly
criticized and its empirical results suggest an anti-plaintiff bias that does not offer a worthy norm to
translate into ADR. See Clermont et al., supra note 20 (identifying anti-plaintiff effect in results for
employment discrimination claimants in federal courts); Selmi, supra note 20 (asserting that proof of
intent represents certain legal norms that make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in employment
discrimination claims); Berger, supra note 17, at 499-50 (describing the "daunting task" of prevailing in
an employment discrimination claim because of "doctrinal hurdles" related to burdens of proving a
disparate treatment claim of employment discrimination).
121. Weckstein, supra note 50, at 504, 563.
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mediators. 12' As a result, Weckstein offered a couple of solutions to the
dilemma of balancing party self-determination with mediator neutrality in
an employment dispute.'23 After advising the employee to seek legal
counsel, Weckstein also suggested that one additional response may include
asking the counsel for the employer to explain the law if the employee is
unable to hire his own attorney. However, Weckstein recognized that the
employer's counsel may be resistant to explain the law to the employee.
124
Another option that Weckstein has suggested is to get the parties to agree
that legal norms may play a role in reaching informed consent and to seek
permission from the parties allowing the mediator to discuss those legal
norms with either party, as requested. Again, the employer's counsel may
recoil at this suggestion because counsel can fill that role for the employer
and the lack of counsel for the employee is not the employer's concern and
may even put the employer at an advantage.
These are all good options for any employment discrimination
mediator who is concerned that an employee may not understand the legal
norms involved or will accept an agreement without consideration of those
legal norms. Such an agreement would suggest a lack of informed consent.
Also, because the mediator has suggested all of these options, even if the
employer's counsel refuses, it may highlight to the employee that it is
imperative to seek counsel. Finally, the mediator may withdraw if still
concerned about the power imbalance between the parties.
ii. Power to the Parties, Not Power to the Mediator
Those who have argued for the mediator to be able to deliver justice in
outcomes are not dealing in reality and are placing too much power in the
hands of the mediator, who already plays such an influential role in how the
parties resolve their dispute. 125  In fact, we should be concerned about
mediators taking too much control either directly or indirectly because they
think they understand how the dispute should be resolved and they want to
"drum some sense" into the parties. 26 Thus, asserting that mediators should
deliver justice opens up the mediation process to being misused "in the
name of justice" as those mediators impose their own terms on the
parties."z7 Mediators do not hear enough of the dispute from both sides or
122. Id. at 507, 562.
123. Id. at 560-63.
124. Id. at 561.
125. Coben, supra note 59, at 74 (referring to concerns about self-determination and neutrality as
being marshaled as the cornerstone concepts of mediation when "the practice reality is the routine, but
undisclosed mediator exercise of influence").
126. Id. at 77.
127. Id. (describing how "real justice will remain elusive so long as mediation mythology.., and
mediation practice is marked by active (and most commonly) surreptitious spinning of the
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from all witnesses to be in a position to effectively determine whether a
proposed resolution to a dispute represents a fair legal outcome.
128
Of course, mediators should use effective questioning and "reality
testing" to ensure informed consent and to facilitate the parties'
objectives. 29  Certainly some mediators will be chosen with the goal of
effectuating social justice. 3 ° However, the whole process of mediation
would break down if the mediator considers his or her primary role as doing
justice between the parties by making sure the outcome complies with the
mediator's view of what the existing legal norms are. No party wants to
necessarily reach an agreement that presents substantively unfair terms.
But the mediator should not make that call. Parties who are paying for the
time of the mediator and possibly their own lawyers and investing their own
time would likely be surprised to find that their mediator believes the most
important thing is to reach a just result in the view of the mediator.'
Rather, the mediator must assess how much of a social justice goal fits
the desires of the parties on an individual case-by-case basis and act
accordingly. In those rare circumstances where a mediator believes that an
agreement reached in mediation will effectuate social injustice and the
parties still want to proceed with that agreement after being fully informed
and subjected to thoughtful questioning by the mediator, then the mediator
always has the option to withdraw.'32 But the mediator could be wrong in
assessing the legal norms because he or she lacks all the information
necessary to make an informed evaluation.'33
Those who argue for social justice in mediation have become
unrealistic and have forgotten about the pragmatic concerns in deciding
conversation"). Although Coben is concerned about the mediator's focus on settlement rather than
justice, I think that allowing the mediator to focus on notions of justice may also allow too much
influence on the part of the mediator under the guise of delivering justice.
128. See Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n.123.
129. See Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather than
One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 295, 303-05 (describing the difference between reality
testing and evaluative questioning); Weckstein, supra note 50, at 521 (referring to "Socratic dialogue...
as a form of reality testing (a technique also used by facilitative mediators) to educate the parties and
move them toward an appropriate settlement").
130. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues In Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths,
1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 88-90 (asserting that in order to address concerns of racial or gender justice, the
parties may select mediators on the basis of race or gender).
131. See Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n. 123.
132. See Weckstein, supra note 50, at 553-54 (describing the approach of withdrawing from the
mediation when the mediator perceives a "'bad' or unfair outcome" and referring to the approach of
mediator Gary Friedman). According to mediator Gary Friedman, he will not usually express an
"opinion about the fairness of the agreement" unless he is convinced it is "grossly unfair." Id.
However, if he believes it is "grossly unfair" and the parties still want to go forward despite his
objection, he "will resign as mediator" because "as mediators, we cannot pretend that we are value free,
even in situations where it is desirable to keep our beliefs from intruding." Id.
133. Subrin, supra note 39, at 220 n.123.
2005
352 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 26:2
what represents justice in an individual dispute in which they are not actual
participants and have no obligation to work with that party in pursuing
justice after the mediation ends. Of course, the background and skills of the
mediator and his or her own experiences may foster the ability to raise
questions and help the parties explore options including the opportunities
for some form of social justice. 13 4
iii. Reject Most Predetermined Mediator Approaches
Similar to my concerns about those who are proponents of
transformative mediation, I am skeptical of those who make claims about
seeking to deliver social justice and desire to apply so-called legal norms in
mediation prior to meeting with the parties and assessing what the parties
want. Any notions of such social justice may be a happy byproduct but
should not be the focus of the mediator before he or she has even met the
parties and investigated the parties' interests and goals and used questioning
to test certain values and expectations. As one commentator has
demonstrated, mediation can present problems when the mediator has
already predetermined that he or she will focus on issues of forgetting the
past or neglecting hurt feelings, as some mediators are primed to do as a
matter of course or technique to get the parties to focus on their current
interests rather than what has already happened to them.'35
Instead, by taking a deliberatively open and conscious approach to
doing what the parties want, mediators can alleviate concerns about power
imbalances, especially in comparison to the court process.136 Another
commentator has recently suggested that mediation does not necessarily
foster power imbalances because it is voluntary, consensual, and non-
adversarial. Accordingly, mediation also arguably allows a party who is "at
a disadvantage" to "always call a halt to the mediation" if there is a
problem, and a "mediator has a vital role in ensuring that the parties have
real control over the outcome."' 3 7  Even if power imbalances exist,
mediation allows and encourages party participation that provides a
mechanism to draw out and address power imbalances rather than
134. Gunning, supra note 130, at 86-93 (describing situations where social justice concerns may
require intervention by the mediator).
135. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to
Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 112-13 (2004).
136. See Jeffery R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REv. 881, 939 (2004)
(acknowledging that "the risk [of problems with power imbalance in mediation] is real, [but] it is
minimized significantly in any well-facilitated deliberative process-perhaps minimized to the point that
the risk of disempowerment is less than that which weaker individuals face in court").
137. Agusti-Panareda, supra note 114, at 29.
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proceeding in court or settling privately where attorneys may play a more
decisive role that just perpetuates those imbalances. 13 8
Any predetermined focus on a particular methodology that does not
necessarily focus on what the parties want allows the mediator to have too
much of an influence on the process by following the dictates of the
mediator rather than the dictates of the parties.'39 Having a predetermined
approach constrains the use of other approaches a party may desire or
need. 4 ° For example, even a predetermined focus on problem solving or
settlement can neglect the importance of "legal and moral" issues in a
particular conflict.' 4 ' Other than a predetermined approach to provide
procedural justice and focus on party self-determination, whether there are
party power imbalances or not, mediator activism should not try to deliver
social or distributive justice absent clear party agreement and up front
disclosure by the mediator to the parties of an intent to do so. Any other
forms of justice beyond procedural justice will have to ultimately come
from the parties, not the mediator. The most likely party to make that move
would be the employer who has the bargaining power to design a conflict
resolution system that allows for various forms of justice.
IV.
WORKPLACE CONFLICT RESOLUTION DESIGN:
MEDIATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Employers have unique incentives to develop fair conflict resolution
procedures, and mediation can offer opportunities for successful measures
in addressing workplace discrimination issues. 4 2  Dennis Nolan has
138. See Seul, supra note 136, at 940.
139. See Della Noce et al., supra note 90, at 47-49 (describing how mediator decisions about
structure can influence the process); see also Bush & Pope, supra note 98, at 72 n.7 (recognizing that
there are other theories in support of why parties seek mediation and accepting that the transformative
model does not provide a definitive answer but arguing that other models don't do so either); see also
Gunning, supra note 105, at 90-91 (raising concerns about transformative mediation in that it fails to
recognize and address concerns about imbalances of power and social justice).
140. See Della Noce et al., supra note 90, at 60 n.81, 63 (showing how even the creators of the
transformative approach acknowledge that asserting that one approach is the normative approach runs
contrary to other approaches and will "constrain others").
141. Stempel, Fuzziness, supra note 16, at 352 (describing a hypothetical problem in an ABA
negotiation competition and criticizing its unrealistic focus on the problem solving model because the
"heinous conduct of [one party] was comparatively minimized as were the undoubted emotions that
must have arisen" because of that conduct in order to "smooth[] over past differences for a
comparatively modest fee" because the "'problem solving' [approach] usually only works when all
disputants are acting in good faith").
142. Due to a concern for diversity in their ranks, corporations have a strong interest in rooting out
workplace discrimination. See Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After
Forty Years: The Promise ofADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOWARD L.J. 937, 959-63 (2005).
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identified the following "minimal elements" or factors to consider in
designing a just system for employment dispute resolution based upon the
contractual intentions of the parties: selection of the third-party neutral,
procedural rules, remedial authority, and allocation of costs. 143 In looking at
the design of a mediation program, employers should consider these factors
along with addressing the balance of power for employees while offering
mediation at its earliest opportunity.'"
In adopting conflict resolution and mediation procedures, employers
must provide employees a fair opportunity to have lawyers represent their
interests in these disputes. 145  If employers do not become proactive about
this, Congress may step in and provide more incentives for plaintiffs'
attorneys to seek legal fees 146 or unions may step in and fill the legal
representation void.
147
Surprisingly, a number of employers offer legal representation to their
employees because it helps both the employee and the employer in the
alternative dispute resolution process. 48  In doing so, these employers can
143. See Dennis Nolan, Labor and Employment Arbitration: What's Justice Got to Do with It?,
DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 1998, at 40, 46.
144. See Berger, supra note 17, at 516 & n. 192 (advocating the earliest possible use of mediation
for its greatest value and noting "widespread agreement" in support of using mediation at the earliest
possible time); Gourlay & Sodequist, supra note 41, at 286 (advocating same); LaRue, supra note 40, at
492 (advocating the use of ADR at it earliest stages to have the greatest value).
145. Bingham et al., supra note 66, at 344, 345 ("Representation is one element of dispute system
design, an element that is judged to be fundamental to fairness . . . " and "[a]n employment dispute
resolution program that promotes employee direct participation, with any representative of his or her
choice, might similarly have a positive effect on how employment disputes get processed."); Berger,
supra note 17, at 535-36 (noting that "power imbalance is surely greatest in cases of lopsided
representation" and asserting that the "best practice" would be for the employer to provide counsel for
employees); Green, supra note 32, at 73-75 (describing the difficulties in employment discrimination
mediations for a claimant without legal counsel).
146. The Civil Rights Act of 2004, introduced by Senator Kennedy, was intended to not only ban
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims, but also to provide further clarity
and potential for lawyers representing civil rights plaintiffs to obtain attorney's fees. See Green, supra
note 32, at 60 n.15 (describing purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 2004, and citing Ritu Kelotra,
Fairness: The Civil Rights Act of2004, POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council,
Washington, D.C.), Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 5, available at http://www.prrac.org/newsletters/
marapr2004.pdf).
147. See Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 77, 98-108
(2003) (describing incentives for unions to help level the playing field for individual employees
subjected to mandatory arbitration agreements); see also Bingham et al., supra note 66, at 376-77
(finding that "union representation during mediation sessions may have benefits for both the employee
and the employer" and asserting that individuals join unions as "associate members" in order to receive
some benefits of having unions represent them in mediation); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 47
(describing the possibility that mandatory arbitration "may lead to an increased spurt of unionization or
other collective action on the part of employees"); see also Yelnosky, supra note 40 (advocating the use
of employee caucuses to bridge the representation gap in mediation).
148. Berger, supra note 17, at 536; Michael Z. Green, Ethical Incentives for Employers in Adopting
Legal Service Plans to Handle Employment Disputes, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (describing
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point to a real advantage for their employees versus other employers whose
employees must find counsel to help them navigate the dispute resolution
system.'49 Lawyers, as repeat players, become a stabilizing effect on the
fairness of the mediation process. They also help remove concerns about
unauthorized practice of law, and lack of informed consent. Although the
lack of attorney involvement in mediating Title VII claims represents a
significant concern,15 mediators, through the implementation of procedural
justice and self-determination principles, should make sure that the parties
have an opportunity to effectively participate in mediation and that the
lawyers do not dominate the parties in the proceedings.15'
Because the mediator plays such an important role, the process for
selecting the mediator must be fair and not coercive. To accomplish this
goal, employers must allow employees the ability to have legal counsel who
can advise employees in the mediator selection process. Also, the
employee should have some rights to reject the selection of mediators that
the employee or the employee's counsel have concerns about. Mediator
selection should be a collaborative and involved process for all parties.
Furthermore, the process must allow victims of employment discrimination
under Title VII to have realistic opportunities to choose people of color and
women as the mediator in order to ensure the perception of fairness.'52 This
can be achieved by making sure that there is a viable and critical mass pool
of mediators of color and women to choose from in the final mediator
selection process.
situations where employers have advantages when choosing legal service plans to help their own
employees obtain legal counsel in resolving employment disputes through the use of ADR and
suggesting continued growth in the adoption of these plans by employers); Green, supra note 32, at 114-
15 (describing the Brown & Root Legal Service Plan provided to its employees); Green, supra note 142,
at 968 (same).
149. See Green, supra note 148 (asserting that employers can derive significant human resource
benefits by providing their employees with legal representation through legal service plans even when
employees use the legal services for representation in disputes with their own employers).
150. See Berger, supra note 17, at 500 (describing workers' difficulties in hiring a lawyer for
discrimination claims); Green, supra note 32, at 73-75 (same).
151. See Subrin, supra note 39, at 222 n.127 ("Clients can tell their story to the mediator, even
when the lawyer does not want the client to talk in front of the other side."); see also Butcher, supra note
41, at 254 (describing concerns about "allowing attorneys to become too empowered in the resolution of
the dispute, thus detracting from the voices of the participants").
152. See Berger, supra note 17, at 537 (noting that "[c]ompanies further enhance the appearance
and the reality of fair process when they permit the employee to participate in choosing the mediator" as
"[s]uch latitude makes good sense; especially if the employer pays the mediation outfit's fees, the
employee might otherwise fear that the mediator will not be impartial"); Michael Z. Green, An Essay
Challenging the Racially Biased Selection ofArbitrators for Employment Discrimination Suits, 4 J. AM.
ARB. 1, 49-57 (2005) (asserting the benefits of having a diverse pool of qualified arbitrators and
mediators of color to be selected by employees of color in resolving employment discrimination disputes
in order for the conflict resolution system to be perceived as fair).
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Although some feel that legislative and legal change are the only ways
to get employers to respond to employment discrimination,'53 some
employers already use fair conflict resolution systems. These systems
include the type of fair mediation procedures that level the playing field for
employees by offering legal representation, minimizing costs, and allowing
employees to pursue court action if unsuccessful in mediation.'54
A 2002 survey describes twenty employer dispute resolution programs
that offer some hope for fair employment dispute resolution. Some of these
programs offer either "incentives" or "rewards" as motivation for
employees to obtain independent counsel, an important concern in making
sure the program is fair.'55 As an example of a broad dispute resolution
program that attempts to level the playing field, the Shell RESOLVE
program offers many steps before culminating in mediation and then it
allows arbitration as an optional choice where the employee may still file
suit in court afterwards.'56 This type of program can allow a fair and quick
result. And in those rare situations where a public and formal adjudication
is necessary, an employee who needs that formal judicial forum to obtain
justice may still seek that method of resolution.
Thus, while recognizing the value and necessity of conflict rather than
viewing it as unhealthy, successful resolution can still proceed through
developing fair mediation processes as part of a comprehensive conflict
resolution program designed to tackle employment discrimination in our
society as we advance into the twenty-first century.
153. 1 have referred to these proponents of legislative solutions who rely on legal changes for
achieving social justice as legislative romanticists because they neglect political concerns and structures
necessary to implement legal change and continue to pursue legislation for social change without
acknowledging the political difficulties in passing the legislation or in getting judges appointed by the
political process to strengthen enforcement of such legislation even if it is passed. Green, supra note
142, at 958 n. 109. As history has shown, even key legislative or legal action that has helped in bringing
about social change has usually occurred at a time when the interests of those seeking change converged
with those of the majority. Id. at 956-63. This interest-convergence theory was first articulated by
Derrick Bell. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) ("The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites."); Richard Delgado, Explaining the
Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 369, 371 (2002) (noting "an impressive insight by Derrick Bell that gains for blacks
coincide with white self-interest and materialize at times when elite groups need a breakthrough for
African Americans, usually for the sake of world appearances or the imperatives of international
competition").
154. Green, supra note 142, at 965-70.
155. Stipanowich, supra note 36, at 901, at nn.234-35. The survey reviews the comprehensive
conflict resolution programs of the following companies: Alcoa, Anheuser-Busch, Bank of America,
CIGNA, Credit Suisse First Boston, General Electric, Haliburton Company, Johnson & Johnson, Masco,
McGraw-Hill, MG Company, Pfizer, Philip Morris USA, Rockwell Automation, Shell, Texaco, United
Parcel Services, UBS Paine Webber, U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Postal Service. Id. at 902-03 (Table
31 describing the nature of the ADR programs for each of the twenty companies).
156. Id.
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But advocates for mediation should not expect it to deliver social
justice because it is limited by the parties' mutual desires. Nor should
mediation be employed as an attempt to quickly suppress conflict. Rather,
a mediator must consider the needs and interests of the parties and allow
procedural fairness to be an expectation of the process. The mediator
should also explore the benefits to be derived from the conflict that has
arisen and work with the parties in coming up with a mutually agreeable
response to that conflict. In some instances, a settlement through mediation
may not be the appropriate response to the conflict and the mediator should
help the parties understand that.
At most, any notions of justice in mediation of employment
discrimination disputes should be limited to procedural justice by allowing
fair procedures and opportunities for voice.'57 As part of that procedural
justice component, parties in mediation must have informed consent and not
just sign away rights without understanding.'58 Furthermore, although
mediation does offer value as a primary tool for resolving employment
discrimination claims in this century, it should not be considered some
magical elixir for all that ails enforcement of Title VII. Instead, it should
only represent one form of dispute resolution in the toolbox that Title VII
claimants can pursue rather than it presenting the end of court litigation by
becoming the only tool in the toolbox.'59
V.
CONCLUSION
The 1990s saw the explosion of the use of mediation in resolving
employment discrimination claims. Forty years after the passage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, many have evaluated the effectiveness
of that law in eradicating discrimination in the workplace. 61 With the
157. See Welsh, Decision Control, supra note 84 (arguing that any attempts to focus on party
control and determination in mediation must provide procedural justice guarantees in the design of any
mediation system).
158. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle For
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 829 n.105 (1999) (highlighting the
importance of making sure parties involved in mediation understand and consent to any agreements
reached through mediation and that there are agreements are not based on coercion of weaker parties by
the mediator or the other side); see also Weckstein, supra note 50, at 530-31 (describing the importance
of informed consent and its compatibility "with the principle of self-determination").
159. See Green, supra note 142, at 958-70 (asserting that various forms of ADR, along with court
litigation, should be considered in resolving Title VII claims but only as part of a comprehensive dispute
resolution approach that recognizes the limitations of ADR and the court system, the unlikely political
prospects for obtaining legal changes to the disputing process, and the possibility of converging interests
of those seeking justice for workplace discrimination with companies' interests in employing a diverse
workforce).
160. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Opportunity Comm'n, Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of Title VII,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/40th/panel (last visited Oct. 15, 2005) (describing three separate panels
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growth of mediation as a tool to resolve employment discrimination
disputes, we must now look at how mediation impacts the effectiveness of
Title VII. Some critics of mediation have referred to it as a system for the
have-nots and a source of concern for those who need the formality and
protection of the public dispute resolution process to achieve social justice.
On the other hand, many supporters of mediation have emphatically
asserted that it offers an opportunity to transform relationships and provide
social justice for victims of discrimination who face significant difficulties
in obtaining justice in the court system.
Nevertheless, a major component of mediation should be self-
determination. Mediators operate as third parties who work with the
disputants in reaching their own agreement. In some situations, true justice,
as some critical race theorists have argued, cannot be delivered through
informal and private dispute systems. 6 ' In those situations, mediation can
bring that point forward and the parties can decide to go seek a public and
formal resolution to obtain the social and distributive justice they desire.
Given the dismal results for employment discrimination claimants in the
court system, mediation offers a fair alternative to explore a resolution
without the difficulties of the litigation process.
Because of concerns about making mediators too powerful and not
focusing on the self-determination of the parties, mediator actions in
employment discrimination disputes should not be presumed to be about
delivering social justice. Mediation of employment discrimination disputes
should focus on what the parties want. No employment discrimination
mediator should decide ahead of time that her job is to do justice between
the parties or transform the parties' relationship because the goals of the
parties would become subsumed by the mediator's goals.
This Article highlights a number of questions that academics have been
raising about self-determination and mediator neutrality goals when
juxtaposed with concerns of justice in employment discrimination disputes.
However, the only real concern is what the mediator's orientation should
be. The answer, in my opinion, is that mediators must focus on helping the
parties achieve what they want. If what the parties want would offend the
mediator's understanding of justice and possibly society's understanding of
justice, the mediator may have no other option than to withdraw.
held to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Title VII). Other programs commemorating the 40h
Anniversary of Title VII occurred in 2004. The Inaugural Wiley A. Branton-Howard Law Journal
Memorial Symposium, Unfinished Business of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Shaping an Agenda for the
Next Forty Years was held at Howard Law School and it included articles by me (Green, supra note
142), and others, see David G. Clunie, Letter From the Editor-In-Chief 48 HOwARD L.J. 815 (2005). A
similar 4 0 h Anniversary of Title VII symposium was held at Hofstra Law School which also included
several articles. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Introduction: The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 Symposium, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 353 (2005).
161. See Bernard, supra note 8, at 140; Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 8, at 1402.
TACKLING DISCRIMINATION WITH MEDIA TION
Given the private and informal nature of dispute resolution through
mediation, notions of justice do not comport with society's goals of open
vindication, judicial review, public scrutiny, and reliable legal precedent.
By its nature and definition, mediation is not necessarily about distributive
justice, unless the parties have designed it that way or let the mediator know
that it is part of their goals. At most, mediators and academics who seem so
concerned and focused about achieving justice in mediation, should realize
that the only goal in mediation of employment disputes should be to assist
the parties in reaching agreement in whatever way is legally and ethically
possible for the mediator. Other than the mediator's own personal ethics
and reality testing of what role the parties may want the mediator to play,
notions of distributive justice should not play any major role in the
mediator's orientation or approach. Maybe the only real goal of justice that
can be consistently obtained through mediation is one of procedural
justice, 6 ' which would give employees a fair opportunity to have their
voices heard. If procedural justice is not enough, then some other process
should be used unless the parties can agree to incorporate additional
components of justice into their conflict resolution process.
For an employer's mediation process to be fair and not just a form of
second-class justice for have-nots, it must offer the following components:
1) encourage, expect and provide mechanisms for employees to obtain legal
representation; 2) provide a critical mass of mediators of color and women
as a qualified cadre of mediators that employees of color and female
employees can realistically select to mediate their employment
discrimination disputes; 3) allow employees some role in the design of
procedures that will constitute the framework for conducting the mediation;
4) require that mediators determine the goals and interests of the parties in
each individual dispute, and as long as those goals do not present any
ethical concerns, the mediator should actively help the parties resolve their
conflict in a way that matches their goals; and 5) allow employees to seek
additional forms of dispute resolution relief, including the right to go to
court if mediation or other informal methods do not work.
Employers and employees have a vested interest in providing a fair
conflict resolution system and in eradicating workplace discrimination in an
increasingly diverse society. One commentator recently explained how the
benefits of mediation in handling employment discrimination claims can
operate fairly without it just being a mechanism for stronger employers to
suppress their weaker employees' legitimate claims:
Mediation is not meant to give every party a shield behind which to hide
and distort their discrimination into something palatable. Its purpose is
162. Stempel, Fuzziness, supra note 16, at 348 (criticizing any focus on having mediators try to
focus on the "power differential" and asserting instead that they focus on "fairness" in the process).
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instead to provide each party with a sword and a shield. The sword operates
to increase the empowerment of parties, allowing them to fully articulate
and assign values to their interests. It strengthens weaker parties by giving
them the opportunity to tell their own stories in their own voices, bringing
in whatever ancillary events they feel are important to fully round out the
narrative, whether or not the events are legally relevant. Behind the shield
the parties have the opportunity to listen carefully to the narrative coming
from the other side and to spend the time and emotional energy necessary to
allow themselves to recognize the opponent's shared humanity. 63
Therefore, mediation, if used appropriately, can be an effective tool to
tackle employment discrimination when the components of the mediation
conflict resolution program provide an opportunity for fairness for the have-
nots without merely serving as a shield for the haves.
EPILOGUE: We now return to the situation of Walter's mediation.
Recognizing that outsiders may look in and feel that Walter should receive
compensatory and punitive damage relief given the appearances of his
claim, the mediator must make sure that Walter seeks legal advice or, at a
minimum, that he understands through informed consent that he is giving
up on those potential remedies. What the mediator should not do is impose
her goals and feelings about justice on Walter. As long as the mediator
believes that Walter understands his actions and still has a strong interest
in ending his dispute in a way that stops the harassment and provides him
with an apology, no third party mediator should decide that Walter has
made a mistake in not seeking more from the employer before reaching an
agreement. If the result appears harsh to Walter in terms of applying legal
norms, we must remember that mediation involves too many private
components that do not comport with public or societal notions ofjustice,
including the primary focus on party self-determination.
Although Walter's satisfaction has been achieved, his settlement may
not help his employer eradicate workplace discrimination. Also, his
settlement might set a bad precedent for that employer who may think that
other employees in Walter's situation may be willing to have a similar final
resolution. Walter may not have any concern about others when deciding
to resolve his dispute. Further, if his employer is unwilling to agree to
additional terms that might resemble what Walter could obtain in court,
and Walter believes it is important to obtain those terms, then Walter may
pursue his claim in court.
If the mediator has focused on what the parties want and not tried to
force a particular approach or result on the parties or tried to deliver her
own beliefs as to what workplace justice should be in this dispute, but
allowed for procedural justice including allowing voice and dignity to
operate throughout the process, the mediator has done all that she need do.
163. Butcher, supra note 41, at 290.
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Any expectations ofjustice beyond that result would have to occur through
some other proceeding where an outside decision maker can assess the
appropriate distributive and social justice result and determine what legal
norms should apply. For the one-shot have-nots, like Walter, who have
informed consent and want to make their own decisions about how their
employment discrimination disputes get resolved, mediation can help them
effectively resolve their claims. For the repeat-player haves, like Walter's
employer, mediation should not represent a shield to suppress legitimate
conflicts from seeing the light of public resolution. Rather, through
working with Walter and the mediator, it allows the haves to determine
their results without being worried about the uncertainties of an outside
decision maker through the court system.
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